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No. 19003 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents are the record owners of the subject property 
and appellants allege a security interest in the property. 
This is an action for quiet title by respondents and 
foreclosure of the alleged lien by appellants. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court found appellants' interest in the 
property was extinguished and appellants now have no interest 
in the property. Based on that finding, appellants 
stipulated to entry of summary judgment in favor of 
respondents. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents ask this court to affirm the judgment entered 
by the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In September, 1980, appellants (American Coin) entered 
into a Commodities Purchase Agreement with L. H. Investment 
Company (R. 280-284). Under the terms of the Commodities 
Purchase Agreement, American Coin agreed to advance 
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$"00,00.00, and L. H. Investment was obligated to deliver to 
Arner1can Coin, on October 22, 1980, the amount of gold, of a 
specified quality, which could be purchased at 90.5% of the 
London afternoon price that day, thus providing a return on 
American Coin's investment of 9.5% per month or 114% per 
annum. (R. 280, paragraph C). 
To secure performance of the Commodities Purchase 
Agreement, L. H. Investment executed a promissory note to 
American Coin in the sum of $200,000.00, which provided 
additional interest at 18% per annum (the "Trust Deed Note") 
(R. 271-273), and executed a Trust Deed covering the subject 
property (the "Trust Deed"), which provided it was for the 
purpose of securing the $200,000.00 promissory note and 
included a dragnet clause covering future advances. (R. 
275-278). The Trust Deed Note provided: 
This note is given as collateral security to 
assure performance by the undersigned of their 
obligations under that certain Commodities Purchase 
Agreement, and this Note shall be deemed paid in 
full upon strict performance by the undersigned of 
their covenants and obligations under the terms of 
the attached Commodities Purchase Agreement and this 
Note shall thereupon be returned to the undersigned 
and the Trust Deed secured hereby reconveyed and the 
lien thereof released of record. (R. 271, 2nd 
paragraph). 
On or about October 22, 1980, L. H. Investment requested 
that it be allowed to repurchase the gold which it held ready 
for delivery as required under the Commodities Purchase 
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Agreement and American Coin agreed to sell the gold to L. H. 
Investment. (R. 286, paragraphs 1-3). L. H. Investment anc' 
American Coin then entered into an Amendment to the 
Commodities Purchase Agreement, under which the gold which L. 
H. Investment held ready for delivery to American Coin was 
sold by American Coin to L. H. Investment. (P. 286-287). As 
consideration for the right to repurchase the gold, L. H. 
Investment paid American Coin $19,000.00 which represents the 
9.5% discount and agreed to deliver to American Coin on 
November 22, 1980, the amount of gold which could be 
purchased for $200,000.00 at 90.5% of the London afternoon 
price on that date. (R. 286, paragraph 4). Paragraph 6 of 
the Amendment to the Commodities Purchase Agreement provided: 
It is expressly agreed by the parties that this 
contract is supplemental to the previous Agreement 
of the parties, which is by this reference made a 
part hereof, and the terms, conditions and 
provisions thereof, unless specifically modified 
herein, are to apply to this contract and are made a 
part of this contract as though fully set forth 
herein • • • (R. 287). 
On or about November 22, 1980, L. H. Investment again 
held ready for delivery to American Coin the gold agreed to 
be delivered on that date. Again, American Coin resold the 
gold to L. H. Investment in consideration of L. H. 
Investment's payment of $19,000.00 and agreement to deliver 
to American Coin on December 22, 1980, the amount of gold 
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.,111ch could be purchased at 90.5% of the London afternoon 
price on that day. (R. 293, paragraph D). 
On or about December 8, 1980, L. H. Investment conveyed 
the subject property to respondents (Jones) by Warranty 
Deed. The Warranty Deed recited that it was subject to the 
Trust Deed given by L. H. Investment to American Coin to 
secure the Commodities Purchase Agreement and $200,000.00 
Note, but the obligations under the Agreement and Note were 
not assumed by Jones. (R. 19, paragraph 3). Rather, L. H. 
Investment remained obligated to perform under the Agreement 
and Note. At the time the Warranty Deed was delivered and 
recorded, L. H. Investment's performance under the 
Commodities Purchase Agreement, Note and Trust Deed was due 
December 22, 1980. (R. 293, paragraph H). 
On or about December 22, 1980, American Coin again resold 
to L. H. Investment the gold which L. H. Investment then held 
ready for delivery. L. H. Investment again paid the 9.5% 
discount and further agreed to deliver to American Coin on 
January 22, 1981, the number of ounces of .999 fine gold that 
$200,000.00 would purchase at 90.5% of the second London fix 
price on that date. (R. 293, paragraph 4). 
On or about January 22, 1981, American Coin and L. H. 
Investment entered into a new agreement entitled Revised 
Commodities Purchase Agreement. (R. 293-301) The new 
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Agreement, which provides it was to become effective Decemr,, 
22, 1980, (R. 301, paragraph 30), recites the prior deal inf], 
and contracts between the parties and sets forth the same 
scheme for the purchase and delivery of gold as in the 
original Agreement. (R. 293-294). The new Agreement dated 
January 22, 1981, however, includes a repurchase option, 
entitling L. H. Investment to repurchase the gold on each 
delivery date in lieu of delivering the gold. The new 
Agreement, in contrast to the Amendment to the original 
Agreement, also provides: 
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement 
among the parties pertaining to the subject matter 
hereof, and supersedes all prior agreements and 
understandings pertaining thereto. No covenant, 
representation, or condition not expressed in this 
Agreement shall effect or be deemed to interpret, 
change or restrict the express provisions hereof. 
(R. 19, paragraph 19). 
Consistent with the above quoted provision of the new 
Agreement, a new Note dated January 22, 1981, in the 
principal sum of $219,000.00 was executed by L. H. Investment 
in favor of American Coin. (R. 290-291). In spite of the 
fact that L. H. Investment had conveyed the subject property 
to Jones on December 8, 1980, the new Agreement included 
warranties by L. H. Investment that it had the legal right 
and ability to obtain title and possession to the subject 
property and that it would provide American Coin an ALTA 
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Lenders Title Insurance Policy insuring that 
appellant had a first Trust Deed security interest in the 
subject property. (R. 296, paragraph 9 (c}). 
L. H. Investment performed under the new Agreement dated 
January 22, 1981, until March or April, 1981, when it failed 
to deliver the gold. (R. 124, paragraph 5). American Coin 
then gave Notice of Default under the new Agreement and new 
Note. (Id.) The present action was then commenced seeking a 
judgment declaring that the new Agreement and new Note are 
not secured by the subject property. 
On April 8, 1982 American Coin's motion for summary 
judgment was heard by the Trial Court. At the hearing 
American Coin admitted there were no disputed issues of facts 
and that all facts necessary for a determination of American 
Coin's interest in the property were before the Court. (R. 
504, 506). The trial court, as requested by American Coin, 
interpreted the writings between the parties and found 
American Coin's lien on the property had been extinguished 
and it had no interest in the property. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
L. H. INVESTMENT STRICTLY PERFORMED ITS 
COVENANTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 
ORIGINAL COMMODITIES PURCHASE AGREEMENT AND 
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TRUST DEED NOTE THEREBY TERMINATING 
APPELLANTS' RIGHTS IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. 
Under Utah law, satisfaction or performance of an 
agreement or obligation secured by collateral terminates, , 
a matter of law, the lien on the collateral. In Aird 
Insurance Agency v. Zions First National Bank, 612 P.2d 34' 
(Utah, 1980), the Court held: 
A pledge of security affords rights in the 
pledgee only to the extent that the secured 
obligaiton may become in default. Moreover, the 
nature of the obligation secured is a function of 
the agreement between the parties •.• 
Satisfaction of an obligation secured by a pledge 
terminates, as a matter of law, the pledgee's rights 
in the collateral. Such termination is inherent in 
the definition of a security interest •• 
Consistent with the applicable law, under the express 
terms of the Trust Deed Note executed in September 1980, 
strict performance by L H Investment of its covenants and 
obligations under the original Commodities Purchase 
Agreement, a copy of which was attached to the Note, 
constituted payment in full of the note and release of the 
Trust Deed lien. The note specifically recites it was givec 
as collateral security to assure performance under the 
Commodities Purchase Agreement and provides: 
And this Note shall be deemed paid in full upon 
strict performance by the undersigned of their 
covenants and obligations under the terms of the 
attached Commodity Purchase Agreement and this Note 
shall thereupon be returned to the undersigned and 
the Trust Deed secured hereby reconveyed and the 
lien thereof released of record. 
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Accordingly, the first issue raised is whether L. H. 
Investment performed its obligations under the September, 
1980 Commodities Purchase Agreement and Trust Deed Note. 
The original Commodities Purchase Agreement was in effect 
from September 1980 to December 22, 1980. The new Revised 
Commodities Purchase Agreement became effective December 22, 
1980. American Coin, by the recitals in the new Agreement, 
acknowledged L. H. Investment held ready for delivery the 
required amount of gold on each delivery date through 
December 22, 1980. In fact, American Coin has never claimed 
a breach or default of the original Commodities Purchase 
Agreement or Trust Deed Note and there is no dispute that L. 
H. Investment strictly performed its obligations under the 
first Agreement and Amendment thereto through December 22, 
1980. American Coin's argument is that the new Agreement was 
merely an extension or modification of the first Agreement. 
A. Whether the Revised Commodities Purchase 
Agreement dated January 22, 1981, was a new 
agreement or merely an extension or 
modification of the first agreement was 
properly determined by the trial court 
based on the written contracts and no 
material issues of fact exist. 
Appellants argument to this Court that questions of fact 
exist as to the intent of the parties to the contracts is 
without merit for two reasons: First, American Coin 
expressly represented to the trial court that both parties 
-9-
relied upon the terms of the written contracts to establish 
the facts and specifically requested the court to rule on th• 
issue based on its interpretation of the written contracts. 
Its counsel urged the court as follows: 
Ms. Heilbrun: The issue before the Court in this 
matter is a simple single issue of law regarding the 
validity and priority of a recorded Trust Deed owned 
and held by my clients, American Coin Portfolios, 
Inc. and Oakwood Manor • • • . The Jones, as do we, 
appear to rely on the terms of the writings between 
the parties to establish the operative facts. At 
least in that we agree. Our interpretation differs 
obviously. That's why we are here today. This 
Court can determine which interpretation is correct 
from the express contracts and summary judgment can 
be granted. (R. 504, 506). 
Having so urged the trial court, appellants are estopped from 
now claiming the trial court erred because questions of fact 
exist. It is well-settled that: 
The rule that a party will not be allowed to 
maintain inconsistent position is applied in respect 
to positions in judicial actions and proceedings. 
As thus applied, it may be regarded not strictly as 
a question of estoppel, but as a matter in the 
nature of a positive rule of procedure based on 
manifest justice and, to a greater or lesser degree, 
on considerations of orderliness, regularity, and 
expedition in litigation •••• The rule against 
inconsistent position applies generally to positions 
assumed not only in the course of the same action or 
proceeding, but also in proceedings supplemental 
thereto, including proceedings for review or 
retrial. • • 2B Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and 
Waiver, S 69 at 696-697. 
Second, while the intention of the parties may be a 
question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances 
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tn a dispute between the parties to an agreement, when the 
<lispute is between a party to the agreement and a third party 
(not a party to the agreement), the intent must be 
determined solely from the express language of the document 
itself. James Weller, Inc. v. Hansen, 517 P.2d 410 (Ariz. 
App. 1973); Stearns v. Williams, 240 P.2d 833 (Ida. 1982); 
Lepel v. Lepel, 456 P.2d 249 (Ida. 1969). 
In James Weller, Inc. vs. Hansen, supra, Hansen and 
Cherokee Construction Company (like American Coin and L. H. 
Investment) were involved in several transactions pertaining 
to the property involved. Weller performed work on the 
property and filed notice of a mechanic's lien, naming 
Cherokee as the owner. In the litigation, Hansen sought to 
quiet title to the property and Weller sought to foreclose 
its mechanic's lien. Hansen claimed he did not receive the 
required notice of the mechanic's lien. Weller argued that 
based on the contracts between Hansen and Cherokee, they were 
joint venturers and therefore the notice to Cherokee was 
sufficient. Hansen argued there was a factual issue and the 
relationship between him and Cherokee had to be based on 
their intent and determined from all the relevant 
circumstances. The Court held: 
While the intent of the contracting parties is 
essential as between the parties, where there is a 
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clear and unambiguous contract, as here, the 
contract controls as to Weller, a third party. 
* * * 
The intent of the contracting parties to 
form a partnership is always an essential element of 
a partnership as between the partners themselves, 
but as to third parties, the relation will be 
determined from the facts rather than the 
conclusions of the co-partners as to the nature of 
the business relationship. Id. at 1114-1115. 
Jones was not privy to the contracts between American 
Coin and L. H. Investment. Therefore, whether the second 
contract was a new agreement or merely a modification of the 
first agreement must be determined from the express language 
of the contracts, as urged by American Coin in the trial 
court, and not from the conclusions of the parties to the 
contracts, as now argued by American Coin. 
B. The Trial Court's Interpretation of the Written 
Contracts was correct. 
American Coin's contention that the new Agreement was 
merely an extension or modification of the old Agreement is 
untenable, particularly when the express terms of the new 
Agreement are compared with the terms of the October 22, 198C 
Amendment to the original Agreement. When the original 
Agreement was extended and amended in October 1982, the 
Amendment provided: 
It is expressly agreed by the parties that this 
contract is supplemental to the previous agreement 
of the parties, which is by this reference made a 
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part hereof and the terms, conditions and provisions 
thereof, unless specifically modified herein, are to 
apply to this contract and are made a part of this 
contract as though fully set forth herein. 
In contrast, when the new Agreement was made in January, 
1981, after strict performance of the old Agreement, it 
provided: 
This agreement constitutes the entire agreement 
among the parties pertaining to the subject matter 
hereof, and supersedes all prior agreements and 
understandings pertaining thereto. No covenant, 
representation or condition not expressed in this 
Agreement shall affect or be deemed to interpret, 
change, or restrict the express provisions hereof. 
(R. 19, paragraph 19). 
In each case the contract language is clear and 
unambiguous. In October 1980 when the Commodities Purchase 
Agreement was to be merely modified, it was done by 
amendment, which expressly provided it was supplemental to 
the original agreement,and incorporated all provisions of the 
original agreement not expressly modified. 
Also noteworthy is the fact that no new note was executed 
to secure the Amendment. In contrast, a completely new and 
separate contract was prepared and signed by the parties in 
January 1981. The new contract recites full performance of 
the original agreement and expressly provides it supersedes 
all prior agreements. Additionally, a new note securing the 
new contract was prepared and signed. The new note is for a 
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different principal amount and does not by its terms purµort 
to be a renewal or extension of the old note. 
American Coin's reliance on First Security Bank of Uta!i 
v. Proudfit Sporting Goods Co., 522 P.2d 123 (Utah 1976), is 
misplaced. In Proudf it this Court held that the holder of a 
security interest did not lose its priority as to an 
intervening judgment creditor where the debtor obtained an 
extension or renewal of a note to the holder of the security 
interest. The original obligation in that case was never 
satisfied but was extended. The Proudfit case would be 
applicable to this case if L. H. Investment had not performej 
under the original contract and had obtained an extension of 
time in which to perform. The undisputed facts in this case, 
however, are that L. H. Investment did perform under the 
original contract. The new contract was not an extension of 
time for L. H. Investment's performance, but, in fact, 
recites full performance by L. H. Investment under the first 
contract and expressly provides it supersedes all prior 
agreements. 
In sum.mary, under applicable Utah law and by the express 
provisions of the September 1980 Trust Deed Note, the Note 
was deemed paid in full, and the trust deed lien terminated 
when L. H. Investment performed its obligations under the 
September 1980 Commodities Purchase Agreement and the 
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thereto. The clear and unambiguous language of the 
written contract supports the trial court's finding that the 
Revised Commodities Purchase Agreement was a new contract and 
not a mere extension of the earlier agreement. L. H. 
Investment did not have title to the subject property in 
January 1981, when the new Agreement was made and therefore 
could not give American Coin a security interest in the 
property as it purported to do. 
POINT II. 
THE REVISED COMMODITIES PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
AND TRUST DEED NOTE, DATED JANUARY 22, 
1981, ARE NOT SECURED BY THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY UNDER THE SEPTEMBER, 1980, TRUST 
DEED. 
Since the obligations under the original Commodities 
Purchase Agreement were fully performed and the original 
Trust Deed Note thereby fully paid and American Coin's only 
claim of default is under the new Agreement and new Note, its 
claim to a security interest in the property under the 
September 1980 Trust Deed is necessarily based on the future 
advance provision of the Trust Deed, commonly known as a 
"dragnet clause". The dragnet clause provided that in 
addition to the $200,000 promissory note, the Trust Deed 
secured "the payment of such additional loans or advances as 
hereafter may be made to Truster, or its successors or 
-15-
assigns, when evidenced by a Promissory Note or notes 
reciting that they are secured by this trust deed." 
Dragnet clauses such as this are not favored in equity 
and are to be carefully scrutinized and strictly and narrowlJ 
construed. First Security Bank of Utah v. Shiew, 609 P.2d 
952 {Utah 1980); Osborn, Nelson & Whitman, Real Estate 
Finance Law, Section 12.8 (1979). In this case, the dragnet 
provision does not extend the trust deed to the new 
Commodities Purchase Agreement or new Trust Deed Note, dated 
January 22, 1981, for three reasons: 
A. Once the Original Note Was Fully Paid and 
Discharged, the Trust Deed Lien Was Extinguished and 
Could Not Thereafter Secure Future Loans. 
One rule quoted with approval by this Court in First 
Security Bank of Utah v. Shiew, supra, and applied by courts 
in construing and limiting the application of dragnet 
clauses, is stated by Osborn, Nelson & Whitman as follows: 
Once the original debt has been fully 
discharged, the mortgage is extinguished and cannot 
secure future loan. Id. at 774. 
As discussed under Point I, there is no dispute that L. 
H. Investment fully performed each and every obligations 
under the original Commodities Purchase Agreement. The 
original Trust Deed Note, by its express terms, was deemed 
paid in full upon L. H. Investments' performance of its 
covenants and obligations under the original Commodities 
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Purchase Agreement. Accordingly, the lien created by the 
September 1980 Trust Deed was extinguished. The new 
Agreement made in January, 1981, which by its terms 
superseded all prior agreements and understandings between L. 
H. Investment and American Coin, and the new Note signed at 
that time, could not be secured by a lien which had been 
extinguished. 
B. The Obligations Under the January 22, 1981, 
Agreement and Note, which Appellants Claim Were 
Breached, Were Incurred After the Property Was 
Conveyed to Jones. 
According to Osborne, Nelson & Whitman, supra, another 
rule applied by courts in construing dragnet clauses is: "If 
the real estate is transferred by the mortgagor to a third 
party, any debts which the original mortgagor incurs 
thereafter are not secured by the mortgage.• Id. at 775. 
This rule was also quoted with approval by this Court in 
First Security Bank of Utah v. Shiew, supra, and was adopted 
by the drafters of the Uniform Land Transfer Act. ULTA 
§ 3-205 (d). 
The same rule was applied by the Texas courts in Vaughan 
v. Crown Plumbing and Sewer Service, Inc., 523 S.W.2d 72 (Tx. 
Ct. App. 1975), a case with facts strikingly similar to the 
present case. On May 13, 1974, Crown Plumbing purchased an 
apartment complex from Gayne. The sale was subject to 
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several existing liens on the property, but the obligations 
secured by said liens were not assumed by Crown. One of tile 
liens was created by a trust deed dated February 1, 1972, in 
favor of Vaughan, which contained a clause purporting to 
cover future advances. On July 29, 1974 (after the sale to 
Crown) Gayne signed another promissory note to Vaughan. 
Gayne defaulted on this ooligation and Vaughan proceeded with 
the requisite notices to conduct a trustee's sale, claiming 
the July 29, 1974 note was secured by the February 1, 1972 
trust deed. Crown brought suit and obtained a TRO and 
preliminary injunction enjoining the trustee's sale. The 
appellate court affirmed, holding that the February 1972 
trust deed did not secure the obligation of Gayne to Vaughan 
because it arose after Gayne transferred the property to 
Crown. 
In the present case, the only obligations which American 
Coin claims were breached arose after L. H. Investment 
conveyed the subject property to Jones. Accordingly, these 
obligations are not secured by the September 1980 Trust Deed. 
c. The Dragnet Clause in the September 1980 Trust Deed 
Does Not Extend the Trust Deed Lien to the 
Obligations Under the January 22, 1981 Agreement and 
Note Because The Obligations Under the New AgreP.nent 
Were Voluntary and Not Obligatory. 
The general rule regarding priority between an original 
lien holder who makes a future advance to the mortgagor and a 
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•hird party who acquires an interest in the mortgaged 
prnrerty after creation of the initial lien, but before the 
future obligation is incurred by the mortgagor is that if the 
future advance is voluntary rather than obligatory and the 
mortgagee has notice of the intervening third-party's 
interest, the interest of the third party takes priority. 
Osborne, Nelson & Whitman, §12.7, supra. 
This rule was applied by the trial court and affirmed by 
this Court in Western Mortgage Loan Corporation v. Cottonwood 
Construction Co., 424 P. 2d 437 (Utah 1967). The following 
analysis of this rule was suggested by the Court in First 
Security Bank of Utah v. Shiew, supra: 
• • • In a case where there is no obligation to make 
future advances, a mortgage, which purports to 
secure future advances, cannot do so until such 
advance has been made. Until such time, the 
provision merely represents an expression of the 
intention of the mortgagor and mortgagee that the 
mortgage shall operate as a security for the 
obligations of the mortgagor with respect to such 
advances, if and when such obligation arises. Thus, 
these provisions, at most, represent an offer by the 
mortgagor to provide the security of the mortgage 
for such advances if and when they are made. • • • 
_!!!. at 956. 
In the present case Coin had no obligation to 
enter into the January 22, 1981 Agreement and Note. Their 
acts were purely optional and voluntary. Jones' deed was 
recorded December 8, 1980 and American Coin therefore had 
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notice of it when it voluntarily entered into the new 
Agreement. As explained by the Court in Shiew, supra, the 
dragnet clause represented merely an of fer by L. H. 
Investment to secure future obligations with the September 
1980 Trust Deed when they arose. When the obligations arose 
in January 1981, however, L. H. Investment had already 
conveyed the property to Jones. Accordingly, the obligations 
which arose at that time could not be secured by the subject 
property under the 1980 Trust Deed. 
In addition to the three legal grounds set forth above 
supporting the ruling of the trial court, there is a basic 
policy reason for not extending the September 1980 trust deed 
lien to the obligations created under the January 1981 
Agreement and Note. Real property is commonly sold in this 
state subject to existing trust deed liens. In such 
transactions, it is important that the buyer know exactly to 
what liens his title is subordinate. If dragnet clauses were 
enforceable against third persons whose interests in the 
property are known to the parties at the time the future 
advance is made, the seller could create further encumbrances 
on the property after selling it and the buyer would not know 
the extent of the liens having priority. In that case a 
buyer may pay a substantial purchase price, but end up with 
no equity in the property. The existing practice in this 
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· of buying property subject to a prior trust deed with a 
dtagnet clause is obviously based on the assumption that the 
existing lien cannot be increased or extended to other 
obligations created by agreement between the mortgagor and 
mortgagee after the sale. A contrary rule would necessarily 
and unfairly prejudice the buyer and make the prevailing 
practice of selling property subject to a trust deed lien 
totally impracticable. 
POINT III. 
THE DOCTRINES OF EQUITABLE SUBROGATION, 
EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION AND EQUITABLE 
MORTGAGE ARE NOT APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT 
CASE. 
Appellants urge the Court to apply the doctrines of 
equitable subrogation, equitable subordination and equitable 
mortgage to the facts of the present case in order to prevail 
on this appeal. These doctrines are totally inapplicable to 
this case for the reasons: 
A. Equitable Subrogation. 
Subrogation is the substitution of a person who satisfies 
a claim or debt in place of the creditor so that he succeeds 
to the rights of the creditor in relation to the debt or 
claim. Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. Western Fire 
Insurance Company, 597 P.2d 622, 629 (Kans. 1979). 
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The law in Utah with respect to equitable subrogation wa 
reviewed extensively in Martin v. Hickenlooper, 59 P.2d 11!9 
(Utah 1936) where the Court recognized that there are two 
kinds of subrogation, "legal" and "conventional". Legal 
subrogation, commonly referred to as equitable subrogation, 
arises "where the person who pays the debt of another stands 
in the situation of a surety or is compelled to pay to 
protect his own right or property." Id. at 114 (quoting 
Bingham v. Walker Brothers Bankers, 75 Utah 149, 283 P. 1055 
(1929). Conventional subrogation "occurs where one is under 
no obligation to make payment, and who has no right or 
interest to protect, pays the debt of another." Stated 
simply, legal subrogation arises by operation of law, whereas 
conventional subrogation arises from contract or the 
agreement of the parties. Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. 
Western Fire Insurance Company, supra at 629. State Farm 
Mutual Assets Insurance Company v. Foundation Reserves 
Insurance Company, 471 P.2d 737, 741 (N.M. 1967). Equitable 
subrogation is not applicable to the present case for the 
following four reasons: 
First, American Coin did not pay off a lien held by 
another party. The Trust Deed lien, originally held by 
American Coin was extinguished by L. H. Investments' 
performance and satisfaction of obligations under the 
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.nrnndities Purchase Agreement. (See Point I). American 
r_'oin's interest in the Note and Trust Deed were fully 
extinguished at the time the second Agreement and second Note 
were executed January 22, 1981. Therefore, Coin did 
not pay the lien on the Subject Property and cannot be 
subrogated to the prior lien. 
Second, assuming, arguendo, that Coin paid the 
prior indebtedness, equitable subrogation cannot be applied 
in the present case because American Coin would have paid its 
own obligation and succeeded to its own rights as creditor. 
Subrogation by definition contemplates "the substitution of 
one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful 
claim, demand or right, Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th 
Ed. at 1595. There is no basis for the application of the 
doctrine of equitable subrogation where the creditor is the 
same person both before and after the debt had been paid. A 
common thread which runs through all cases dealing with 
equitable subrogation is that the person who pays the 
creditor is a separate and distinct person from that 
creditor. (See, generally, those cases cited in Martin v. 
Hickenlooper, supra). 
Third, even assuming, arguendo, that American Coin paid 
the indebtedness, the circumstances of the present case do 
not come within any recognized basis for subrogation. Legal 
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subrogation cannot be applicable to the present case becau 3 " 
American Coin was neither a surety nor was it compelled to 
make any payment to protect its interest. A party is 
compelled to make a payment to protect its interest in those 
cases where it must do so or lose its interest such as where 
it is a co-owner of the property. 
Likewise, conventional subrogation is inapplicable. The 
Court in Martin v. Hickenlooper, supra at 1141, held 
"[c]onventional subrogation occurs where one who is under no 
obligation to make payment, and who has no right or interest 
to protect, pays the debt of another ••• " The Court 
further held that in order to come within the principles of 
conventional subrogation the lender had to be" ••• in no 
way related to the property or in any way required to protect 
an interest " Id. at 1151. American Coin is not 
entitled to the application of the doctrine of conventional 
subrogation since it had a right or interest in the property 
and was related to the property as the lien holder. 
Fourth, equitable subrogation will be applied only "where 
no innocent parties will suffer or no right has intervened." 
Id. at 1142. "Subrogation will not be permitted where it 
will work any injustice to others." Transamerica Insurance 
company v. Bowes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783, 786 (1972) · 
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In the present case, Jones did not assume the obligations 
of L. H. Investment, it took title to the property subject to 
those obligations. Jones reasonably expected that those 
obligations would be satisfied by L. H. Investment, as they 
in fact were. To give American Coin a security interest in 
the property by applying equitable subrogation would unduly 
prejudice Jones' rights with respect to the property. The 
amount of prejudice is clear, $200,000. l'lhen L. H. 
Investment satisfied its obligations thereby extinguishing 
the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed, Jones' equity in the 
property increased by $200,000. This was in accord with 
Jones' understanding that the obligations of L. H. Investment 
would be satisfied on or before December 22, 1980. 
B. Equitable Subordination and Equitable Mortgage. 
An equitable mortgage is created when one party advances 
u?on the faith uf by the debtor that he 
will have a security interest in property of the debtor for 
the satisfaction of his debt. It is well-settled that the 
equitable lien or mortgage takes effect at the time of the 
transaction between the parties. Garnett State Savings Bank 
v. Tush, 657 P.2d 508 (Kans. 1983). In Fitzgerald v. 
F_itzgerald, 155 PP. 791 at Syl. 11 1 (Kans. 1916), the court 
held that a lender becomes an equitable mortgagee of the 
property from the time the agreement is made. 
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While an equitable mortgage creates equitable interests 
in the property, those interests are subject to prior liens. 
Schmelzle v. Key, Inc., 452 P. 2d 41 (Colo. 1969). Equitable 
mortgages are also subject to prior known equitable 
interests. 55 Am.Jur.2d, Mortgages § 10 at 200-201. 
Therefore, even if the doctrine of equitable subordination 
and equitable mortgage were applicable in the present case, 
American Coin's interest in the Subject Property vested at 
the earliest on January 22, 1981 when the 1981 Revised 
Agreement and Note were executed. All legal and known 
equitable interests existing prior to that date would have 
priority over the interest of American Coin. 
In their brief, American Coin refers to 55 Am. Jur.2d 
Mortgages § 332 at 399 for the proposition that an equitable 
mortgage "is effective not only against the parties thereto, 
but also against others who secure their interests with 
knowledge of the rights of mortgagee." (Brief of appellant 
at p. 22). The quotation from which the above-recited 
reference was taken is as follows: 
A mortgage which is operative to transfer an 
interest in the mortgaged property to the mortgagee 
in equity only is effective, like other equities, 
not only against the parties thereto, but also 
against others who secure their interests in the 
property as volunteers or with notice of the rights 
of the prior mortgagee. 
55 Am. Jur.2d Mortgages§ 332 at 399 (emphasis supplied). 
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It is apparent that the above-quoted provision is 
applicable only to those who secure their interest in the 
property with notice of a prior equitable mortgage. 
American Coin's equitable mortgage could not have been 
prior to the Jones' interest. Jones recorded their deed to 
the Subject Property on December 8, 1980. The equitable 
mortgage claimed by American Coin could not have been created 
until January 22, 1981. Jones could not have had notice of 
American Coin's equitable mortgage until nearly a month and 
one half after their deed had been delivered to them. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's ruling was proper and should be 
affirmed for the following reasons: 
1. The obligations and covenants under the original 
Commodities Purchase Agreement were strictly and fully 
performed by L. H. Investment. Strict Performance of those 
obligations constituted payment in full of the obligation. 
2. The obligations under the new Agreement and Note 
dated January 22, 1981, could not be secured by the September 
1980 trust deed because: (a) the trust deed lien was 
extinguished before the new obligations arose, (bl they were 
incurred after the property had been conveyed to Jones, (c) 
lhe obligations under the new Agreement and Note were 
-27-
voluntary and not obligatory, and (d) a contrary ruling 
be inconsistent with the prevailing practice of selling real 
property in this state subject to trust deed liens. 
3. The doctrines of equitable subrogation, equitable 
subordination and equitable mortgage are not applicable in 
the present case and cannot provide American Coin a security 
interest in the Subject Property prior to that of Jones. 
DATED this 29th day of July, 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 4- (J,_£( 
oavidG:wrrfams 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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